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INFORMED CONSENT IN ILLINOIS?
HAROLD L. JACOBSON*
HE band wagon for informed consent began rolling about twenty
years ago. Some states have climbed aboard, others have heard
the drums but are just beginning to face the music, and the band
wagon has not yet reached others. It remains to be seen whether the
courts which have not been called upon to express their opinions as to
the validity of informed consent will reject or accept the theory. Up to
this time the courts of Illinois have not been confronted with the choice.
The term "informed consent" has arisen to describe a theory in medi-
cal malpractice which allows a cause of action to a person who consents
to medical treatment without first having been adequately informed as
to the nature and consequences of the attendant risks. Although in-
formed consent does not pertain to negligence in the prescribing of
treatment, or in the actual treatment rendered by the physician, there
does seem to be general agreement that the theory of informed consent
sounds in negligence rather than in assault and battery.'
In Natanson v. Kline,' a frequently cited opinion, the court, distin-
* MR. JACOBSON is a partner in the firm of Lord, Bissell and Brook of Chicago, Illinois.
He is also an instructor at the Lawyers Institute in Chicago, Illinois. He received an
LL.B. from Loyola University Law School.
1 See Note, Physician's Duty to Warn of Possible Adverse Results of Proposed Treat-
ment Depends Upon General Practice Followed by Medical Profession in the Com-
munity, 75 HARV. L. Rv. 1445 (1962) ; Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice,
55 CALIF. L. REV. 1396 (1967).
2 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 401-02, 350 P.2d 1093, 1100-01 (1960), rehearing
denied, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960):
"What appears to distinguish the case of the unauthorized surgery or treatment from
traditional assault and battery cases is the fact that in almost all of the cases the physician
is acting in relatively good faith for the benefit of the patient. While it is true that in
some cases the results are not in fact beneficial to a patient, the courts have repeatedly
stated that doctors are not insurers. The traditional assault and battery involves a
defendant who is acting for the most part out of malice or in a manner generally
considered as 'antisocial.' One who commits an assault and battery is not seeking to
confer any benefit upon the one assaulted. The fundamental distinction between assault
and battery on the one hand, and negligence such as would constitute malpractice, on
the other, is that the former is intentional and the latter unintentional. Hershey v.
Peake, 115 Kan. 562; 223 P. 1113 (1924); and Maddox v. Neptune, 179 Kan. 465; 264
P.2d 1073 (1953). We are here concerned with a case where the patient consented to the
treatment, but alleged in a malpractice action that the nature and consequences of the
risks of the treatment were not properly explained to her. This relates directly to
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guishing between an assault and battery and a negligent act of malprac-
tice, held that the doctrine of informed consent sounds in negligence.
However, confusion as to the nature of the theory, as one of battery or
negligence, is evidenced in the opinions of some courts which have at-
tempted to apply the doctrine.'
As indicated in Natanson, the doctrine of informed consent concerns
the question of whether or not the nature and consequences of the pro-
posed operation or treatment have been adequately explained to the
patient. One of the first judicial statements describing this duty ap-
peared in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees,4
in which the court labored with the legal and nonlegal difficulties con-
fronting the doctor in determining just what should be told to a patient
concerning his treatment.
To determine whether Illinois would adopt such a doctrine, we must
first look to the basis of the duty to disclose to the patient the nature
and consequences of a proposed treatment or operation. As stated in
Natanson v. Kline:
The courts frequently state that the relation between the physician and his patient
is a fiduciary one, and therefore the physician has an obligation to make a full
and frank disclosure to the patient of all pertinent facts related to his illness. 5
the question whether the physician has obtained the informed consent of the patient to
render the treatment administered."
3 See, e.g., Shetter v. Rochelle, 2 Ariz. App. 358, 409 P.2d 74 (1966) ; Gray v. Grunnagle,
423 Pa. 144, 223 A.2d 663 (1966).
4 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 180-81 (1st Dist. 1957):
"A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if he
withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by
the patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician may not minimize the
known dangers of a procedure or operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At
the same time, the physician must place the welfare of his patient above all else and this
very fact places him in a position in which he sometimes must choose between two
alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon
any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote; this may well result in
alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse
to undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in
actually increasing the risks by reason of the physiological results of the apprehension
itself. The other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate problem, that the
patient's mental and emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be
crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must
be employed consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent. See Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517; 88 S.E.2d. 762 (1955). Cf. Simone v.
Sabo, 37 Cal. 2d 253; 231 P.2d 19 (1951); Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital,
211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92; 52 UL.R.A., N.S. 55 (1914)."
5 Natanson v. Kline, supra note 2, at 403, 350 P.2d at 1101.
The "fiduciary relationship" between physician and patient has been
recognized in Illinois in a different context,' where the question arose
as to whether a contract between physician and patient could be pre-
sumed fraudulent. It seems to be a logical step to extend this fiduciary
relationship to the duty to disclose. No court has ever denied that there
is a fiduciary relationship between physician and patient which requires
disclosure under normal circumstances. Nor does it seem that an Illi-
nois court would be justified in denying that, in general, some duty to
disclose exists. The belief that each person's body is inviolable has
historic roots in Anglo-American law.7 In light of this belief, it seems
reasonable to require that a physician disclose to the patient the nature
and consequences of the proposed treatment or operation so that the
patient himself can make an "intelligent decision" as to whether the
physician should proceed as proposed. Thus, it would appear that Illi-
nois courts, like the courts of all the other states that have' considered
this problem, may well hold that such a general duty of disclosure
exists.
There is greater diversity of opinion as to the specifics of the duty
to disclose. This diversity is most frequently displayed on the issue of
whether the plaintiff must present expert testimony as to a standard of
disclosure (i.e., whose standards of proper conduct are to be applied
in this area, the medical profession's or the jury's?).
Everyone is aware of the imperative need for the wrongfully injured
party's case to reach the jury. Plaintiffs feel that malpractice cases are
not receiving their share of jury determinations. Those advocating more
jury determinations in malpractice cases believe that the defendant can
adequately argue the law to the jury under a given set of facts. They
further believe that depriving a plaintiff of jury determination by the
court's directing a verdict discriminates against the injured plaintiff in
this type of case as opposed to certain kinds of other tort cases. They
seem content that a jury can satisfactorily determine these complicated
and technical medical questions without regard to their lack of medical
training. Most of those courts which have considered the problem state
the standard of disclosure as being what a reasonable medical practi-
tioner would disclose regarding the nature and consequences of the
proposed treatment or operation under the same or similar circum-
OSee Zeigler v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Il. 180, 196-97, 91 N.E. 1041,
1047 (1910).
7 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., U.S. 1, 17 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., dissent);
In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
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stances. Use of such a standard will almost invariably result in-requir-
ing that the plaintiff establish the standard of disclosure in a particular
case by expert medical testimony. The states that have adopted this
general rule as to the requirement of expert testimony are: Delaware,
Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey,
South Dakota, Texas, Washington and Wyoming.' In addition, it ap-
pears, though it is not completely clear, that this general rule has been
adopted in New York and Tennessee. However, there are a few cases
holding contrary, and some law review articles suggest that there should
be no requirement of expert medical testimony as to the standard of
disclosure.1 ° States where cases have been reported holding that expert
testimony is not a requisite part of plaintiff's case are New York, Mis-
souri and Minnesota."
The New York case of Fiorentino v. Wenger12 held that the defen-
dant physician, the only physician in the county employing a certain
surgical procedure, was obligated to disclose that the procedure pro-
posed was novel and unorthodox and that there were risks incident to
its use. There is no indication in the opinion of the appellate court that
there was any expert medical testimony; indeed, it would appear impos-
sible for anyone other than defendant himself to testify as an expert
since he was the only physician using the procedure. In the absence of
a standard in the medical community, it was necessary for the court to
use its own standard. This does not necessarily mean that there is no
requirement of expert medical testimony under ordinary circumstances.
On appeal the New York Court of Appeals stated:
[I]t is perhaps the most delicate matter, often with fluctuating indications, from
8 Delaware: DiFillippo v. Preston, 53 Del. 550, 173 A.2d 333 (1961); Florida: Ditlow
v. Kaplan, 181 So.2d 226 (Fla. App. 1965); Iowa: Grosjean v. Spencer, 258 Iowa 685,
140 N.W.2d 139 (1966) ; Kansas: Collins v. Meeker, 198 Kan. 390, 424 P.2d 488 (1967) ;
Michigan: Roberts v. Young, 369 Mich. 133, 119 N.W.2d 627 (1963); Minnesota:
Ericksen v. Wilson, 266 Minn. 401, 123 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Missouri: Aiken v. Clary,
396 S.W.2d 668 (Mo. 1965); New Jersey: Kaplan v. Haines, 96 N.J. Super. 242, 232
A.2d 840 (1967) ; South Dakota: Bloch v. McVay, 80 S.D. 469, 126 N.W.2d 808 (1964);
Texas: Wilson v. Scott, 412 S.W.2d 299 (1967) ; and Wyoming: Govin v. Hunter, 374
P.2d 421 (Wyo. 1963).
) Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y. 2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296 (1967); Ball v. Mallinkrodt
Chemical Works, 53 Tenn. App. 218, 381 S.W.2d 563, 19 A.L.R.3d 813 (1964).
0 See supra note 1.
]I New York: Fiorentino v. Wenger, 26 App. Div. 2d 693, 272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296 (1967) ; Missouri: Mitchell v.
Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960); and Minnesota: Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp.,
251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958).
12Supra note 9.
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time to time with the same patient, whether a physician should advise the patient
(or his family), more or less, about a proposed procedure, the gruesome details,
and the available alternatives. Such a decision is particularly one calling for the
exercise of medical judgment.1'
Thus, it would seem that the rule in New York is that expert testimony
is required in order to establish the standard of disclosure.
The rule in Natanson v. Kline, discussed above, has been limited to
its facts by subsequent cases. 4 In Natanson, there was no disclosure of
any collateral risk by the physician. The subsequent Kansas cases"
hold that expert medical testimony is required, except when the physi-
cian has made absolutely no disclosure. These cases recognize that the
physician's silence does not preclude him from showing that his silence
complied with medical standards under the circumstances.", No other
courts have expressed an opinion as to the wisdom of this modification
of the rule requiring expert testimony; however, it appears that the
Kansas rule is a historical accident resulting from the Kansas court's
unwillingness to overrule Natanson v. Kline. There does not appear to
be any convincing reason why the silence of a physician should be
treated differently if the silence fulfills the reasonable medical standard,
unless the situation is so unusual as to make it reasonable for a jury
to conclude that the failure to disclose is prima facie evidence of negli-
gence. However, in Collins v. Meeker,'17 the Kansas court held that
res ipsa loquitur was not applicable in medical malpractice actions.
This seems to indicate that there is no logical basis, other than an
attempt by the law to create a minimum standard, for this exception
to the rule requiring medical testimony to establish the standard of
disclosure.
The Missouri court, however, was not as reluctant to correct its
earlier mistake. In Mitchell v. Robinson,' the court held that expert
testimony was not required to prove a prima facie case. Aiken v.
Clary9 overruled Mitchell, holding that the plaintiff, in order to sus-
13Supra note 9, at 415, 227 N.E.2d at 300 (emphasis added).
14 Collins v. Meeker, supra note 8; Williams v. Menehan, 191 Kan. 6, 379 P.2d 292
(1963).
15 Collins v. Meeker, supra note 8; Williams v. Menehan, supra note 14.
16 Collins v. Meeker, supra note 8, at 398, 424 P.2d at 495.
17 Supra note 8.
's Supra note 11.
19 Supra note 8.
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tain his burden of proof, must offer expert testimony to show what
disclosures a reasonable medical practitioner would have made under
the same or similar circumstances.
Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital° presents a situation in which
the requirement of expert medical testimony can legitimately be dis-
pensed with. In Bang, plaintiff submitted to a prostate operation, a
necessary part of which involved the severance and tying off of the
spermatic cords. At issue was whether the physician had disclosed to
the patient the fact that sterilization would accompany the operation.
The court held that this was a question for a jury and that no expert
testimony was needed to establish whether or not the physician should
have disclosed the unavoidable result of sterility. The court held the
physician had such a duty as a matter of law where no immediate
emergency existed and the patient had a choice of going without
treatment which might prove injurious, or undergoing a treatment
which would necessarily make him sterile. The Bang case was later
distinguished in Ericksen v. Wilson, 2 1 wherein the Minnesota rule
requiring expert testimony was enunciated. The point of distinction
between Bang and Ericksen is that in Bang a procedure was used
which involved a touching (the cutting of the spermatic cord) to
which the patient did not consent, whereas in Ericksen there was no
unconsented touching, but rather the complaint was based upon a
failure to disclose collateral risks. Thus, the Minnesota court charac-
terized the Bang case as involving a battery. A distinction more con-
sistent with the above statement can be found in Roberts v.- Young:
The case of Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital . . . is not in point for the reason
that there a result, serious in nature, was certain to happen, whereas in the case
at bar there was a mere possibility.22
This basis for distinguishing Bang from the usual case involving a
failure to disclose risks seems reasonable. When a result is certain to
occur (i.e., in Bang, sterility), it seems reasonable for the law to es-
tablish this minimum standard of disclosure for which no expert
testimony is needed, since the certainty of the result eliminates some
of the judgment factors necessary in deciding what the standard of
disclosure should be. Thus, there appears to be no strong authority
2 0 Supra note 11.
21 Supra note 8.
22 Supra note 8, at 140, 119 N.W.2d at 630.
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in the case law for dispensing with expert medical testimony in
deciding what the proper standard of disclosure is.
This does not mean that the controversy as to the necessity of
expert testimony has subsided. The particular fact situation presented
in this type of case has produced judicial opinions which leave room
for comment by those theorists and scholars interested in lessening the
plaintiff's burden in the medical malpractice suit. Some have con-
tended that the standard of disclosure is not a medical one, and
therefore, expert medical testimony is not needed to establish the
standard.23 Some of the arguments supporting this view are as follows:
(1) A question of fact as to the reasonableness of the doctor's con-
duct is presented if the doctor has not fulfilled his duty to disclose,
thus allowing the jury to determine whether or not the doctor acted
reasonably without the need of expert medical testimony, just as the
jury decides whether a tortfeasor in other areas of tort law has acted
reasonably or not. (2) In those instances where there is no com-
munity standard, there is no validity to the requirement of expert
medical testimony to show what that expert would do under like cir-
cumstances. (3) The burden on the plaintiff to obtain expert medical
testimony in most, if not all, malpractice cases is unfair because of the
reluctance of such witnesses to appear in court and criticize their pro-
fessional brethren.
Some theorists have advocated changing the standard of disclosure
to be imposed upon the physician. 4 One such standard suggested
has the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the physician, requiring
him to prove the reasonableness of his actions. The plaintiff need not
introduce expert medical testimony to present a prima facie case,
though the defense may use expert testimony in its behalf. The plain-
tiff then has the right of cross-examination as well as possibly calling
the defendant as an adverse witness.
The main criticism of the majority standard is that there is in
reality no community medical standard to be followed which designates
what risks should be disclosed. Yet, expert witnesses have been
testifying as to the standard of disclosure.2'5 The expert testimony
23 See supra note 1.
24 See Note, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALn. L. REV. 1396 (1967).
25 Woods v. Pommering, supra note 8; Gray v. Grunnagle, supra note 3; Wilson v.
Scott, supra note 8; Kaplan v. Haines, supra note 8; Anderson v. Hooker, 420 S.W.2d 235
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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in these cases casts doubt on the argument that no standard exists.
While it can be argued that the testimony consists only of personal
opinions of what good medical procedure is, this is not what the expert
witnesses purport to be testifying about.
The criticism may be advanced that the requirement of expert
testimony to establish the standard of disclosure allows the medical
profession to define its own legal standards of conduct. In response to
just such a criticism of the general requirement of expert testimony
in malpractice cases, Prosser has recognized the judicial reluctance
to overburden the doctor with liability which is imposed by un-
educated judgment.2"
With respect to the criticism of the majority standard, based upon
the fact that plaintiffs often experience difficulty in obtaining expert
witnesses, defense attorneys, who have had their share of losses, do
not believe this is the problem that plaintiffs pretend to make of it. It
may be true that due to the uncertainty in the practice of medicine,
practitioners are less likely to speculate on- mere possibilities just to
formulate a fact question. There is more than lip service paid to the
doctrine that a mistake in judgment is not negligence. However, this
author does not know of any case of real malpractice that was defeated
as a sole result of the unavailability of an expert witness.
It perhaps serves a purpose to look at the cases collectively which
have held that expert testimony is not a requirement. Judicially recog-
nized exceptions to the rule requiring expert testimony have not in-
volved the question of whether the physician adequately disclosed the
collateral risks or hazards in the proposed treatment (excepting the
Kansas rule which dispenses with the requirement of expert testimony
when the plaintiff's case shows that the physician made absolutely no
disclosure as to possible risks). The cases in which no expert testimony
was required have involved: (1) a situation where the physician failed
to inform the patient of a disability that was certain to result from the
proposed operation which was not an emergency requirement;27 (2) a
situation where the physician removed the patient's breast after
obtaining her consent to a mastectomy without explaining its meaning
and the patient clearly made known to the physician that he was just
to make a test of the breast and was not to remove it;28 (3) a situa-
26 PROSSER, TORTS § 32, at 168 (3d ed..1964).
27 Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., supra note 11.
28 Corn v. French, 71 Nev. 280, 289 P.2d 173 (1955).
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tion where the proposed operation or treatment is so novel that a
standard of the medical community could not have been developed;2"
(4) a situation where the physician has knowingly given untrue
answers to the questions of the patient where none of the exceptions
to the rule requiring candor and disclosure apply.3 ° The first situation
appears to fall within the minority holding eliminating the need for
expert testimony. In the latter three situations, dispensing with the
requirement of expert medical testimony seems reasonable, as a jury
can reasonably and intelligently consider such acts of the physician
to be unreasonable and negligent. Indeed, confusion arises in that
these cases could have been based on theories other than informed
consent.
In most cases involving the informed consent theory, the duty
imposed by law is to inform the patient of those possible risks or
hazards involved in the proposed treatment or operation that a reason-
able medical practitioner would disclose under the same or similar
circumstances. Hence, the majority of states take the view that this
standard of disclosure is medical, and therefore, expert testimony
becomes necessary.
Occasionally, a court has held that the physician was under no
duty to disclose the collateral risks and hazards. These decisions
usually are based on the fact that the risks are minimal and disclosure
seems unreasonable. For instance, it has been held that anesthesi-
ologists need not disclose the risks involved in the use of a certain
anesthetic where the risks are minimal.3 Anesthesiologists have also
been held not to have the duty to disclose because it would be un-
reasonable to impose a duty of disclosure on each specialist involved
in each specific step of an operation." Possibly underlying these
rulings is the feeling that the general public recognizes that there are
certain risks involved in the use of any anesthetic.
Even if the plaintiff establishes by expert testimony that the
standard of disclosure of the medical community had not been satis-
fied by the warnings made by the defendant physician, the physician
still may assert the defense that the failure to disclose was justified by
the physician's concern about the patient. It would seem that the
29 Fiorentino v. Wenger, supra note 9.
30 Woods v. Brumlop, 71 N.M. 221, 377 P.2d 520 (1962).
31 Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 415 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
3.2 Bell v. Umstattd, 401 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
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plaintiff's experts could not testify on this subject without knowing
the basis for the defendant's position. Therefore, the plaintiff's ex-
perts would probably have to testify as to the objective standard of
disclosure of the medical community. Several cases that have con-
sidered this question have held that the burden is on the defendant
physician to show the disclosure would have only disturbed the patient
emotionally. 3 However, in Aiken v. Clary,"4 the court stated that the
plaintiff's expert witness would have to consider these subjective
factors in testifying.
A troublesome factual issue on which expert testimony is not
necessary relates to whether the physician actually made the proper
disclosure. If plaintiff testifies that the physician did not disclose the
risk which resulted in injury to him, and plaintiff presents evidence
that good medical practice requires disclosure of that risk, then a
jury question is created. The assertion of the defendant physician
that he made the proper disclosure does not take the case away from
the jury, for the issue is the credibility of the parties, an issue which
the jury traditionally decides.
On the issue of proximate causation, there has also been some dis-
agreement in the cases. The burden of proof on this issue is on the
plaintiff.3 Plaintiff must show that if he had been fully advised as to
the collateral risk (which resulted in his injury), he would not have
submitted to the operation or treatment. 6 There could be no proximate
causation, of course, if the patient knew of the risk which was not
33 Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chemical Works, supra note 9. Contra, Woods v. Brumlop,
supra note 30.
34 Aiken v. Clary, supra note 8, at 674:
"The question is not what, regarding the risks involved, the juror would relate to
the patient under the same or similar circumstances, or even what a reasonable man
would relate, but what a reasonable medical practitioner would do. Such practitioner
would consider the state of the patient's health, the condition of his heart and nervous
system, his mental state, and would take into account, among other things, whether the
risks involved were remote possibilities or something which occurred with some sort of
frequency or regularity. This determination involves medical judgment as to whether
disclosure of possible risks may have such an adverse effect on the patient as to
jeopardize success of the proposed therapy, no matter how expertly performed. [De-
fendant in this case testified that plaintiff was 'real shook.'] After a consideration of these
and other proper factors, a reasonable medical practitioner, under some circumstances,
would make full disclosure of all risks which had any reasonable likelihood of occurring,
but in others the facts and circumstances would dictate a guarded or limited disclosure.
In some cases the judgment would be less difficult than in others, but, in any event, it
would be a medical judgment."
35 See Shetter v. Rochelle, supra note 3.
3 6 Plante, An Analysis of "Informed Consent," 36 FORDHAm L. REv. 639, 641 (1968).
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disclosed by the physician. The causal: connection here can most often
be proved by plaintiff's testimony that he would not have consented
to the operation or treatment if he had known of the risks. Then, unless
the assertion is inherently incredible because of the slight injury
involved, a jury question is presented. One court has held that the
plaintiff's testimony is not necessary, 7 and contrariwise the North
Carolina court has required proof of causation other than plaintiff's
testimony." However, the North Carolina court does not seem to
have maintained that position, since Sharpe v. Pugh,"9 wherein it held
that the plaintiff's allegations in his complaint that he would not have
submitted to the treatment had he known the risks, were suffi-
cient to defeat a motion to strike. Thus, it appears that in most cases
the plaintiff's testimony on the issue of proximate causation would be
sufficient, and, in some states, unnecessary if the other facts of the
plaintiff's case permit the jury to draw an inference that the plain-
tiff would not have given his consent had he been properly informed.
A subsidiary issue may be raised by criticism of the difficulty ex-
perienced by plaintiffs in obtaining expert medical testimony. In some
states, plaintiffs have been able to solve this problem by calling the
defendant physician and eliciting the necessary expert testimony from
him. This procedure is exemplified in Wilson v. Scott,4 ° wherein the
plaintiff called the defendant as an adverse witness. The defendant
testified as to the standard of disclosure and that his statements to
the plaintiff satisfied these standards. Plaintiff testified that the
warnings given by defendant did not satisfy these standards. The court
held that a question of fact was presented by this conflict in testimony.
It is unclear whether such a practice would be permitted in Illinois.
While Section 60 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act would permit a
plaintiff to call the adverse party as a witness, it says nothing about
the calling of the adverse party to provide expert testimony. Section
60 is based on Section 33 of the Act relating to the Municipal Court of
Chicago which in turn was derived from the Minnesota code. Thus,
Minnesota decisions are very high authority in construing the statute.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has held that the plaintiff could not
37 Aiken v. Clary, supra note 8.
38Watson v. Clutts, 262 N.C. 153, 160-61, 136 S.E.2d 617, 622 (1964).
39Sharpe v. Pugh, 270 N.C. 598, 155 S.E.2d 108 (1967).
40 Supra note 8.
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attempt to make the defendant his expert medical witness. 41 Thus, it
would appear that such a practice would be improper under Illinois
law.
CONCLUSION
I tend to feel that our courts will have to look hard at this doctrine
of informed consent. In view of the liberal tendencies prevailing at
this time, it may be anticipated that our state might well adopt the
doctrine. To hope that the need for such a doctrine will be found
wanting seems unrealistic in this age where the ways a plaintiff may
recover money damages are ever expanding.
It is hoped that if Illinois courts recognize this doctrine, it will be
on the basis of another form of negligence. The majority view of the
negligence aspect of this doctrine has undoubtedly been influenced by
the practical and evidentiary problems presented to the other courts.
To preserve sound medical practice and keep evidentiary rules in the
field of malpractice consistent, it is hoped our courts would treat
informed consent on a negligence basis.
Acceptance of the doctrine of informed consent presumes that the
doctor owes the patient a duty to disclose reasonably anticipated
consequences of treatment, or perhaps the lack thereof, which a
reasonable medical practitioner would disclose under like or similar
circumstances. It seems reasonable to assume that if the courts of
Illinois adopt the doctrine, they will follow the almost unanimous
rule requiring expert medical testimony to establish the risks of which
the patient should be informed. By requiring the use of expert testi-
mony, Illinois would also promote harmony between informed con-
sent and the standards of conduct used in all medical practice cases
in this state arising out of other forms of alleged error. As in other
negligence cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. It is difficult to
conceive that society as a whole would benefit by permitting lay
determination of an essentially medical problem. Medical treatment
should continue to be consistent with good medical practice rather
than what may be reasonable to the butcher, the baker, and the
candlestick maker.
Proximate cause is a necessary ingredient in a negligence action.
41 Ericksen v. Wilson, supra note 8. But see Piacentini v. Bonnefil, 69 Ill. App. 2d 433,
217 N.E.2d 507 (1966).
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Emasculation of this element of plaintiff's proof is not to be antici-
pated. There appears to be no justifiable reason to eliminate it. In
the simple case, if need be, plaintiff can personally supply the neces-
sary testimony.
Finally, without going into detail or lengthy discussion, it is this
author's expectation that our courts will not permit the plaintiff to
call a defendant under adverse examination and require him to give
expert testimony against himself.
